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Regulation of nonpoint source pollution often relies in one way or
another on policy instruments based on ambient indicators. For well-
known reasons, enforcement of ambient-based policies is, at best, lim-
ited. If no individual choices or actions are observed, than ambient-
based regulation might be the only feasible approach. Often, some
relevant individual indicators, such as output or certain inputs, are ob-
servable. For such cases, we oﬀer a regulation mechanism that does
away with ambient indicators. The mechanism implements the optimal
output-abatement-emission allocation and gives rise to the full informa-
tion outcome when the social cost of transfers is nil. Special attention
is given to the regulation of (unobserved) abatement.
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Regulation of environmental pollution relies in one way or another on emis-
sion taxes or quotas. Implementing these instruments is straightforward when
individual emissions are observed or can be inferred from readily available
information. Both of these conditions fail to hold in situations involving
nonpoint source pollution and asymmetric information: nonpoint source pol-
lution is prevalent when emissions emanate from many dispersed polluters
and monitoring individual emissions is costly; asymmetric information occurs
when individual characteristics aﬀecting choices are the individual’s private
information.
The bulk of the literature on the regulation of nonpoint source pollution
under asymmetric information relies in one way or another on taxes or quotas
based on ambient (aggregate) indicators (Segerson 1988, Xepapadeas 1991,
1992, Cabe and Herriges 1992). The implementation of ambient-based poli-
cies is limited by a number of well known (and well documented) factors,
such as the indirect relation between individual actions (emission, abatement)
and individual policy response (see discussion in Karp 2005, and references
he cites). The common approach of rectifying these limitations entails com-
bining ambient and individual instruments, such that the former serves as a
threat, inducing potential polluters to comply with the desirable policy or re-
veal their true emission in order to avoid the collective penalty (Xepapadeas
1995, Segerson and Wu 2006, Suter et al. 2010). When the threat is eﬀec-
tive, it need not be exercised in actual practice and the enforceability problem
alluded to above is avoided. However, the same enforceability problem may
render threats imposed by ambient policy instruments non-credible, in which
1case the diﬃculty of using such policies persists.
Any regulation scheme is based in one way or another on observable indica-
tors and since some ambient (or aggregate) indicators are typically observable
(or can be measured at a reasonable cost), it is often straightforward to ex-
ploit them for regulation purposes in nonpoint source pollution situations. If
no relevant individual choices or actions are observable, than ambient-based
regulation may be the only feasible approach.1 However, quite often some in-
dividual choices or actions, related to emission, are observable (e.g., outputs or
some inputs). In such cases it may be possible to design a regulation mecha-
nism for each individual based on these observed individual indicators. This is
the approach taken in this work. We consider a situation in which emission is
proportional to output and the proportionality factor depends on abatement.
Such situations are ubiquitous and include emission from smokestack, where
abatement involves installing end-of-pipe equipment, and emission/pollution
from agricultural runoﬀ or animal waste, where abatement entails the appli-
cation of various treatment technologies.2
The regulator does not observe abatement eﬀorts, hence emission is un-
observed, and knows the polluter’s characteristics (type) up to a probability
distribution. The observable (contractible) variable is output, based on which
contracts are speciﬁed to induce the desirable output, abatement and emission.
Our mechanism design draws on Laﬀont (1994); the main innovation is in the
regulation of the unobserved abatement. The mechanism involves transfers.
1An exception is the regulation mechanism developed by Chambers and Quiggin (1996),
which exploits uncertainty and farmers’ risk aversion to specify a regulation scheme based
only on the observed realizations of states of the world.
2Agriculture and other land use sectors are major contributors to global greenhouse gas
emission (Stern 2007, pp. 196-197) and typically consist of many heterogenous producers,
thus are likely candidates for a nonpoint source pollution situation.
2When the social cost of transfers is nil, the mechanism implements the ﬁrst-
best (full information) output-abatement-emission allocation. When transfers
entail social costs, individual polluters can extract informational rents and the
ensuing allocation deviates from its full information (ﬁrst-best) counterpart.
We show that both output and abatement are smaller in this case, though the
eﬀect on emission is ambiguous.
The next section describes the moral hazard (unobserved abatement and
emission) and adverse selection (asymmetric information) setup and summa-
rizes properties of the production and abatement technologies. Section 3 sum-
marizes properties of the complete information (reference) case. Section 4
speciﬁes the regulation mechanism, discusses implementation and veriﬁes the
optimal properties of the ensuing output-abatement allocation. Sec 5 con-
cludes and the appendix contains technical derivations.
2 Setup
We ignore uncertain conditions aﬀecting emissions, due e.g. to weather,3
and conﬁne attention to deterministic mechanisms.4 Thus, although there are
many polluters, we consider the regulation of one (any). The polluter may
be an individual farmer or ﬁrm, a group of farmers or ﬁrms (with the same
adverse selection character), an industry or a country. We generically refer
to the polluter as the “ﬁrm” and to the regulating agency as the “regulator.”
Emission is proportional to output and the proportionality factor depends on
3Uncertain emission eﬀects become pronounced when agents (ﬁrms in the present case)
and/or the regulator are risk averse (see Chambers and Quiggin 1996, Chambers 2002, for
pollution cum crop-insurance regulation under uncertainty). Here we assume that ﬁrms and
the regulator are risk neutral.
4The term “deterministic” in this context refers to the property that the mechanisms is
applied to each polluter separately rather than to the entire group of polluters (see Laﬀont
and Tirole 1993, p. 119, for a discussion).
3abatement. Properties of the production and abatement technologies are spec-
iﬁed in the next subsection. The asymmetric information (adverse selection)
and observation (moral hazard) structures are characterized in subsection 2.2.
2.1 Output, abatement and emission
The Firm’s output and cost of production are denoted y and C(y,β), re-
spectively, where β ∈ [0, ¯ β] is the ﬁrm’s type (the zero lower bound is assumed
for convenience and can be replaced by any lower bound). The cost function
is increasing and convex in y. Adopting the convention that a higher β is
associated with a more eﬃcient ﬁrm, both the cost and marginal cost decrease
with β, i.e., C2 < 0 and C12 < 0, where subscripts 1 and 2 signify derivatives
with respect to the ﬁrst and second argument, respectively (C1 ≡ ∂C/∂y and
C12 ≡ ∂2C/∂y∂β). Some additional cost function properties (including third
derivatives) will be needed and we summarize all properties here:
C1 > 0, C2 < 0, C11 > 0, C12 < 0, C112 ≤ 0, C122 ≥ 0 (2.1)
for all y > 0 and β ∈ [0, ¯ β].
Emission is proportional to output, e = g(a)y, where a represents abate-
ment eﬀorts (cost) and g : IR+  → [g, ¯ g] is a decreasing and strictly convex
abatement (technology) function satisfying
g(0) = ¯ g > g(∞) = g > 0, g
′(0) < 0, g
′(∞) = 0, and g
′′(a) > 0∀a ∈ [0,∞).
(2.2)
The convexity of g(·) merely reﬂects the diminishing marginal productivity of
abatement eﬀorts.
Emission inﬂicts an environmental damage with associated cost which is
typically increasing and convex in the emission rate. In the interest of simplic-
4ity we assume a linear environmental cost function and let τ represent the cost
per unit emission, so the external cost associated with an output-abatement
allocation (y,a) is τg(a)y.
2.2 Observation and information
The regulator observes output y but not the abatement cost a,5 hence
emission g(a)y is not observed either. Information regarding the ﬁrm’s type
is private and the regulator knows β up to the probability distribution F(β),
with a density f(β) = F ′(β), assumed positive over [0, ¯ β], and a nondecreas-
ing hazard h(β) = f(β)/[1 − F(β)]. Based on the information available to
him, the regulator seeks a mechanism that will induce the ﬁrm to choose the
socially optimal output and abatement eﬀorts (cost). Before developing the
mechanism in Section 4, we look at the complete information case that will
serve as a reference.
3 The reference case: full information
We specify the conditions ensuring the existence and uniqueness of an opti-
mal output-abatement-emission allocation under full information and complete
observation. These conditions turn out to be useful in deriving properties of
the optimal regulation mechanism in Section 4.
Suppose output and abatement are observed by all and the ﬁrm’s type is
common knowledge. Consider regulation via the transfer t (from the regulator
to the ﬁrm), giving rise to the social welfare
py − C(y,β) − a + t − τg(a)y − (1 + λ)t,
5Total cost, C + a, may or may not be observed, with important implications regarding
emission regulation, as discussed in Section 4.
5where p is the output price, assumed given (and taken parametrically by the
ﬁrm), and λ is the social cost of transfer (i.e., each dollar of transfer generates a
deadweight loss of λ×100 cents due, e.g., to transactions costs or distortions).
Letting
π = py − C(y,β) − a + t (3.1)
represent the ﬁrm’s post-transfer proﬁt, the social welfare can be expressed as
(1 + λ)(py − C(y,β) − a) − τg(a)y − λπ. (3.2)
The socially optimal y, a and t (or π) maximize (3.2) subject to the participa-
tion constraint π ≥ 0 and nonnegativity of y and a. The necessary conditions
for optimum are










π = 0, (3.3c)
where in (3.3a) and (3.3b) the equal signs change to less or equal at the corners






and note, recalling (2.2), that q ′(a) = (1 + λ)g′′(a)/(τg′(a)2) > 0. In view
of (2.1), there exists some ﬁnite ¯ a for which p − C1(q(¯ a), ¯ β) = 0 and p −
C1(q(a),β) ≤ 0 for all β ∈ [0, ¯ β] and large enough a. Suppose that




6Then, for any β ∈ [0, ¯ β] equations (3.3a)-(3.3b) admit a positive solution
(a∗,y∗) with y∗ = q(a∗). Requiring, in addition, that
p − C1(q(a),β) −
τg(a)
1 + λ
is decreasing in a for any β ∈ [0, ¯ β] ensures that the solution is unique. A





< 0 for all β ∈ [0, ¯ β] and a ≥ 0. (3.6)
We summarize the above discussion in
Proposition 1. Under (2.1), (2.2), (3.5) and (3.6), equations (3.3a)-(3.3b)
admit a unique and positive solution (y∗,a∗) equals to the socially optimal
output-abatement allocation.
Under complete information there are various ways to implement the op-
timal allocation, e.g., the transfer t = −τg(a)y/(1 + λ), which is equivalent
to a Pigouvian tax of τ/(1 + λ) on emission. We proceed to develop a reg-
ulation mechanism in the genera case of moral hazard and adverse selection,
maintaining throughout properties (2.1), (2.2), (3.5) and (3.6).
4 The regulation mechanism
The mechanism consists of a transfer function ˆ t(y) and an abatement func-
tion ˆ a(y), deﬁned in terms of (the observable) output, and is implemented
along the following steps. The regulator announces the transfer policy ˆ t(y),
based on which the ﬁrm chooses output. Upon observing the ﬁrm’s output,
the regulator imposes the abatement ˆ a(y) – the abatement function evaluated
at the observed output choice – and fully reimburses the ﬁrm for that cost.
7The transfer ˆ t(·) is so speciﬁed that the ﬁrm’s output choice is socially
optimal. Since output is observable, the implementation of ˆ t(·) – i.e., using
it to induce a certain output choice – is straightforward. Implementing the
abatement via the ˆ a(·) function is more subtle since abatement is unobserved.
We return to this issue after the implementation properties of the mechanism
are veriﬁed in Proposition 2.
4.1 Specication of ˆ t(·) and ˆ a(·)
The derivation of the transfer ˆ t(·) and abatement ˆ a(·) functions builds on
the following Direct Revelation Mechanism: The regulator announces func-
tions {Y (·),A(·),T(·)}, following which the ﬁrm reports its type b. Upon re-
ceiving the report b, the regulator assigns the ﬁrm the contract {Y (b),A(b),T(b)},
indicating that the ﬁrm produces Y (b), spends A(b) on abatement activities
and receives the transfer T(b).
The mechanism is truthful if the ﬁrm will (voluntarily) report its type
honestly, i.e., b = β. The ﬁrm’s payoﬀ when it reports b is
˜ Π(b,β) = pY (b) − C(Y (b),β) − A(b) + T(b). (4.1)
Necessary condition for truthtelling is ˜ Π1(β,β) ≡ ∂˜ Π(b,β)/∂b|b= = 0 or
[p − C1(Y (β),β)]Y
′(β) − A
′(β) + T
′(β) = 0. (4.2)
Given C12 < 0 (cf. (2.1)), the monotonicity condition
Y
′(x) ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ [0, ¯ β] (4.3)
is suﬃcient for truthtelling.6
6This can be shown as follows (Laﬀont and Tirole 1993, p. 121). Suppose b ̸=  yields
8The ﬁrm’s payoﬀ under honest reporting is
Π(β) = pY (β) − C(Y (β),β) − A(β) + T(β). (4.4)
Invoking (4.2),
Π
′(β) = −C2(Y (β),β). (4.5)
Since C2 < 0 (cf. (2.1)), Π(·) is increasing and requiring
Π(0) = 0 (4.6)
ensures a nonnegative proﬁt for all ﬁrm types.
Noting (3.2), the expected social welfare equals
∫  
0
{(1 + λ)[pY (b) − C(Y (b),b) − A(b)] − τg(A(b))Y (b) − λΠ(b)}f(b)db
(4.7)
The regulator seeks the functions Y (b), A(b) and Π(b) that maximize (4.7)
subject to (4.3), (4.5) and (4.6).
Consider the subproblem of maximizing (4.7) subject to (4.5)-(4.6), ignor-
ing the monotonicity constraint (4.3). This is an Optimal Control problem
a larger payoﬀ:
˜ Π(b;) > ˜ Π(;) ⇒
∫ b

˜ Π1(x;)dx > 0;
which invoking the necessary condition, ˜ Π1(x;x) = 0 ∀x ∈ [0; ¯ ], can be expressed as
∫ b






˜ Π12(x;z)dzdx > 0:












C12(Y (x);z)Y ′(x)dzdx > 0;
which is impossible when Y ′(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [0; ¯ ], ruling out the possibility that ˜ Π(b;) >









x C12(x;z)Y ′(x)dzdx > 0, which is again impossible when Y ′(x) ≥ 0, ruling out the
possibility b < .
9with two controls, Y and A, and one state, Π. Let Y ∗(b), A∗(b) and Π∗(b)



































It turns out that Y ∗(·), A∗(·) and Π∗(·) are also the optimal solutions for
the problem of maximizing (4.7) subject to (4.5)-(4.6) and the monotonicity
constraint (4.3). This follows from:
Lemma 1. Under (2.1), (2.2) and (3.6), Y ∗′(b) > 0 for all b ∈ [0, ¯ β].









With a monotonic Y ∗(·), the inverse function φ ≡ Y ∗−1 : IR+  → [0, ¯ β]
exists, is increasing and satisﬁes, noting (4.12),
φ(y







for y ≥ Y ∗(0). The functions ˆ t(·) and ˆ a(·) are now deﬁned by:
ˆ t(y) ≡ ˆ π(y) − [py − C(y,φ(y))] (4.16)
and
ˆ a(y) ≡ A
∗(φ(y)). (4.17)
4.2 Implementation
The mechanism based on the transfer and abatement functions speciﬁed in
(4.16) and (4.17) is called the [ˆ t,ˆ a] mechanism. We show that:
Proposition 2. The [ˆ t,ˆ a] mechanism implements the optimal output-abatement
allocation (y∗,a∗).
Proof. Noting (4.16), the ﬁrm’s post-transfer proﬁt, py−C(y,β)+ˆ t(y), equals
C(y,φ(y)) − C(y,β) + ˆ π(y).
The proﬁt maximizing output satisﬁes, noting (4.15),
C1(y,φ(y)) − C1(y,β) = C12(y, ˜ β)[φ(y) − β] = 0
for some ˜ β between β and φ(y). Since C12(y,·) < 0 and φ(·) is increasing, y∗
(cf. (4.12)) is the unique proﬁt maximizing output, implying that the transfer
ˆ t(·) implements the optimal output y∗.
Noting (4.14), the output y∗ identiﬁes β, which together with (4.13) and
(4.17) implies ˆ a(y∗) = a∗, giving rise to the optimal abatement.
11As was noted above, implementing the optimal output via ˆ t(·) is straight-
forward since output is observable. Implementing the abatement via ˆ a(·) is,
however, more subtle since abatement is unobserved. How can the regulator
verify that the ﬁrm actually carries out the abatement ˆ a(y∗) when he cannot
observe abatement eﬀorts in actual practice? After all, receiving an abate-
ment subsidy and performing abatement activities are two diﬀerent things: the
ﬁrst is mutually observed while the second is known only to the ﬁrm. This
problem is resolved when the regulator observes total cost C + a. This is
so because the ﬁrm’s output choice reveals the ﬁrm’s type β (cf. eq. (4.14)).
Once β is known, the regulator can calculate the production cost C(y∗,β)
and deduce the abatement cost from the (observed) total cost C + a.7
When λ = 0 (zero social cost of transfers), the [ˆ t,ˆ a] mechanism implements
the complete information allocation (y∗,a∗), deﬁned by (3.3a)-(3.3b). To see
this, note that y∗ = Y ∗(β) and a∗ = A∗(β), where Y ∗(β) and A∗(β) solve
(4.8)-(4.9) with b = β. But when λ = 0, (4.8) is the same as (3.3a) and (4.9) is
the same as (3.3b). Since the solution of (3.3a)-(3.3b) is unique (Proposition
1), the two solutions must be the same. Under zero social cost of transfers, the
regulator can nullify the ﬁrm’s information rent and the optimal regulations
attains the complete information outcome.












7The use of total cost observation to identify abatement costs is similar in approach,
though not in details, to Laﬀont and Tirole (1986).
























In view of (3.6), the integrand (the term inside the square brackets) is positive,
implying a∗ < a∗, hence y∗ = q(a∗) < q(a∗) = y∗. We summarize the above
discussion in
Proposition 3. (i) When λ = 0 (zero social cost of transfers), the [ˆ t,ˆ a] mech-
anism implements the optimal, complete-information allocation: y∗ = y∗ and
a∗ = a∗. (ii) When λ > 0, the mechanism gives rise to smaller output and
abatement: y∗ < y∗ and a∗ < a∗.
In the case of positive social cost of transfers, noting that g(·) is decreasing,
emission, g(a∗)y∗, may exceed or fall short of its full information counterpart
(g(a∗)y∗), depending on the speciﬁcations of the underlying production and
abatement technologies and the asymmetric information.
5 Concluding comments
We oﬀer a mechanism to regulate nonpoint source pollution based on indi-
vidual outputs rather than ambient or aggregate indicators. The mechanism,
speciﬁed for each individual polluter (ﬁrm) separately, consists of two func-
tions deﬁned in terms of the ﬁrm’s observable output: a transfer function and
an abatement function. The transfer function is so speciﬁed as to induce the
ﬁrm to choose the socially optimal output level. Given the output choice,
13the abatement function determines the optimal abatement eﬀorts. The ﬁrm’s
output choice resolves the asymmetric information (adverse selection) param-
eter, and allows implementation of optimal abatement when the ﬁrm’s total
cost (production and abatement) is observable. If total cost is unobserved,
additional device will be needed to ensure that the ﬁrm actually carries out
the abatement cost for which it has been reimbursed. Such a device may well
be the existing court system – when not performing an activity for which a
ﬁrm has been paid for is considered liable.
When the social cost of transfers is nil, the mechanism implements the
optimal, full-information output-abatement allocation. When the social cost
of transfers is positive, the optimal output and abatement, implemented by
the mechanism, are smaller than their complete information counterparts.
We consider the case in which emission is proportional to output and the
proportionality factor depends on abatement. In actual practice one en-
counters a host of output-abatement-emission structures. There are many
examples of GHG emission reduction possibilities in land use and agricul-
tural production practices that change the relationship between production
and emissions, such as irrigation and water management practices that reduce
GHG emissions from crop production or nutrient management that reduces
emissions from fertilizer application. Abatement in these sectors can come
in the form of soil carbon sequestration practices by changing tillage, crop
rotations, cover crops and grazing practices, as well as purchase of carbon
oﬀsets (Hahn and Richards 2010, Bushnell 2010). Applying the framework
developed here to any particular case will require appropriate modiﬁcations
and veriﬁcation that the properties, established in the present case, continue
to hold.
14Appendix
A Derivation of Y ∗(·) and A∗(·)
With µ(b) representing the costate variable, the Hamiltonian corresponding
to the subproblem of maximizing (4.7) subject to (4.5)-(4.6) is
H(b) = {(1 + λ)[pY (b) − C(Y (b),b) − A(b)]− τg(A(b))Y (b) − λΠ(b)}f(b)
−µ(b)C2(Y (b),b).
Necessary conditions for an interior optimum include
{(1 + λ)[p − C1(Y
∗(b),b)] − τg(A
∗(b))}f(b) − µ(b)C21(Y









′(b) = λf(b) (A.3)
and the transversality condition, associated with free Π(¯ β),
µ(¯ β) = 0. (A.4)
Integrating (A.3), using (A.4), gives
−µ(b) = λ[1 − F(b)]. (A.5)
Substituting (A.5) in (A.1) and rearranging gives (4.8) and (A.2) gives (4.9).
B Proof of Lemma 1
Totally diﬀerentiate (4.8) to obtain Y ∗′D1 = D2, where






















and use has been made of (4.9) to express A∗′ = −g ′Y ∗′/(g ′′Y ∗). Since the
hazard function h(b) = f(b)/[1 − F(b)] is nondecreasing, and (from (2.1))
C12 < 0 and C212 ≥ 0, we have D2 < 0. We next show that D1 < 0.








Y ∗ < 0.























which equals the left-hand side of (3.6) evaluated at a = A∗ and β = b,
verifying the claim.
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